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The Political Economy of Tax Reform in Bangladesh: Political Settlements, 
Informal Institutions and the Negotiation of Reform 
 
 
Mirza Hassan and Wilson Prichard 
 
 
 
Summary 
 
This paper explores the political economy of tax reform in Bangladesh over several decades, 
shedding light on the complex factors that account for unusually effective and sustained 
resistance to significant reform. We contend that it is necessary to understand both deep-
seated formal and informal institutions and the micro-level incentives that shape the 
negotiation of short-term reform in order to comprehend tax outcomes. We describe a tax 
system that is highly informal, largely manual and characterised by high levels of discretion 
and corruption. However, despite appearing highly dysfunctional on the surface, this system 
serves the core interests of powerful political, economic and administrative actors. 
Underpinned by robust informal institutions, the current system delivers low and predictable 
tax rates to businesses, provides extensive discretion and opportunities for corruption to the 
tax administration, and acts as an important vehicle for political elites to raise funds and 
distribute patronage and economic rents. While the tax system has not been without reform, 
individual reform efforts have been constrained by the parameters of this broader settlement, 
leaving competing interest groups to pursue strategic gains at the margins while seeking to 
satisfy external reform demands. This tax bargain reflects Bangladesh’s broader political 
economy, which is characterised by entrenched informal institutions underpinning the 
combination of generally weak governance and high levels of economic growth – the so-
called ‘paradox of Bangladesh’.  
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Introduction 
 
Growing attention to questions of taxation and tax reform in the developing world in recent 
years has been accompanied by increasing recognition of the centrality of politics to 
understanding outcomes (IMF 2011). The centrality of politics should not be surprising: 
taxation lies at the very heart of the relationship between states and citizens, is central to 
shaping economic opportunities, and is fundamental to the redistributive and social policies 
of states. However, while the centrality of politics is increasingly recognised, detailed 
empirical research has remained both rare and fragmented.  
 
A particular challenge lies in the fact that existing research in this area has been 
characterised by two very different intellectual approaches. One approach, growing out of the 
traditions of historical institutionalism and fiscal sociology, has focused on explaining long-
term continuity in tax outcomes by focusing on the persistent influence of formal and informal 
institutions, and on the broader political bargains underpinning them (Lieberman 2003; 
Schneider 2012). The alternative approach has focused more narrowly on individual reform 
episodes, concentrating on the individual incentives of competing interest groups and the 
efforts of reformists to overcome entrenched opposition (Bates 1989; Fairfield 2010, 2013).  
 
In this paper we explicitly link these two traditions in order to explore the political economy of 
tax reform in Bangladesh. By focusing initially on the formal and informal institutions 
underpinning tax outcomes, we place individual reform episodes within a broader historical 
context, highlighting the ways in which individual interests are interconnected and embedded 
in pre-existing informal norms and networks. Meanwhile, relative to accounts focused solely 
on historical institutions and political settlements, our approach injects important attention to 
questions of agency, incentives and the micro-political dynamics of change (Bates 2010).  
 
To this end, the tax system in Bangladesh presents a particularly interesting case study 
owing to the coexistence of two seemingly contradictory realities. On one hand, the tax 
system in Bangladesh is, by conventional measures, among the least effective tax systems 
in the world, characterised by manual administration, low revenue and high levels of 
discretion and corruption. On the other hand, the tax system has witnessed the repeated 
failure of frequently high profile reform efforts, owing to significant resistance to change that 
cuts across political, economic and administrative elites. It is only by combining the two 
intellectual traditions noted above that we are able to make sense of this seemingly 
contradictory reality. 
 
On the basis of extensive interviews carried out over the course of more than two years,1 we 
conclude that the persistent weakness of reform efforts is rooted in durable informal 
institutions, norms and networks – sometimes referred to as a ‘political settlement’ – that 
have made the existing system attractive to powerful economic and political interests. 
Despite high levels of informality, discretion and corruption, the tax system has provided 
generally low and predictable tax rates to key economic actors, while serving as a valuable 
conduit for patronage politics. However, while key features of the tax system have been 
highly resilient to change, they have not been static. They have been consistently contested, 
and renegotiated, with the informal underpinnings of the system challenged by external and 
domestic developments. In order to capture these processes we provide a detailed account 
                                                        
1  These interviews have included leading politicians, tax officials, business leaders, donor officials and civil society actors.  
Some of these interviews have been one-off, but others have been on-going conversations in order to follow the 
evolution of recent reform. An initial part of this research was conducted with the support of the World Bank, which was 
seeking political economy insights to inform subsequent reform initiatives. This period of the research offered access to 
donor officials, as well as official meetings with a cross-section of senior officials within the National Board of Revenue 
(NBR). This included the presentation of preliminary elements of the analysis to a round table of senior officials in May 
2011, which offered validation of some of the broad conclusions. 
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of repeated efforts to reform Value Added Tax (VAT). In doing so, we capture the ways in 
which periodic reform – frequently under pressure from external actors - has been 
negotiated, while being shaped by existing institutions, norms and networks. We thus inject 
important agency and dynamism into our historical account by highlighting the ways in which 
competing groups have sought both to defend existing privileges and exploit reform episodes 
to advance new interests, thus subtly shifting the character of the underlying bargain.  
 
One of the merits of a historically grounded approach to understanding the evolution of 
taxation is that it offers a lens through which to comprehend broader governance dynamics. 
A significant body of literature has long been interested in the so-called paradox of 
Bangladesh – the coexistence of high levels of economic growth with seemingly very weak 
governance (World Bank 2007, 2010; Mahmud et al. 2008).2 This literature has proposed 
that the explanation lies in the existence of a political settlement that is characterised by 
intense partisan competition, high levels of corruption and extensive patronage networks, but 
which is equally built on informal norms and networks that have ensured predictability and 
profitability for leading sectors, led by Ready Made Garments (Khan 2008a, 2010, 2011, 
2013; Hassan 2012; Ahmed et al. forthcoming). Our account provides a detailed empirical 
account of precisely this type of dynamics at work within the realm of taxation. 
 
The remainder of the paper proceeds in five parts. The next section reviews the existing 
literature. Section two presents an overview of key elements of the tax system in Bangladesh 
as it has evolved over the past two decades. Section three reflects on these broad features 
and describes the informal institutions, norms and networks that have underpinned the 
development of the tax system. Having painted this broader picture, section four then turns to 
a more detailed analysis of two critical, and closely related, instances of reform: the original 
introduction of VAT in 1991 and efforts initiated in 2009 to reform the original VAT. Finally, 
section five concludes. 
1 Competing approaches to the politics of 
taxation 
 
Existing research into the political economy of tax reform can be usefully divided into two 
broad approaches: literature focused on incentives, political contestation and the micro 
politics of tax reform, and literature that approaches tax reform through the lens of historical 
institutionalism and broader political settlements.  
1.1 Incentives, political contestation and the micro politics of taxation 
 
The most common approach to the study of the politics of taxation has been to view specific 
tax outcomes as the result of the interests of key actors and contestation between competing 
interest groups. This has, in turn, focused attention on understanding incentives, interests 
and power among key actors, and the ways in which these actors have interacted in shaping 
reform outcomes. 
 
Within this tradition one strand of literature has focused on a set of broad domestic and 
international factors shaping incentives for political leaders to expand tax collection and 
pursue tax reform. This research has particularly highlighted five messages of relevance 
here. First, access to non-tax revenue tends, all else being equal, to discourage domestic tax 
                                                        
2  For example, in 2006 the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators ranked Bangladesh 204th of 212 for ‘control of 
corruption’. Bangladesh has rise to 177th of 212 countries since then, surrounded almost entirely by conflict-affected and 
resource-dependent countries. 
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effort (Bornhorst et al. 2008; Besley and Persson 2011).3 Second, investments in improved 
tax collection are most likely when political elites have long time horizons, and thus expect to 
be able to benefit from costly investments in fiscal capacity (Besley and Persson 2011; Melo 
2007; Levi 1988; Prichard 2009; North and Weingast 1989; Tilly 1992).4 Third, fiscal crisis 
and moments of political transition have frequently played a role in opening new 
opportunities for reform, as they have served to strengthen support for reform while 
disrupting existing networks of resistance (Mahon 2004; Sanchez 2006; Keen and Lockwood 
2010; Fjeldstad and Moore 2008). Fourth, international pressure and support – most often 
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – has often been a driver of reform, though 
reform undertaken in response to external pressure has sometimes been comparatively 
superficial (Mahon 2004; Sanchez 2006; Keen and Lockwood 2010; Moore and Fjeldstad 
2008; Prichard et al. 2012). Finally, a large literature has documented the potential for tax 
competition as states seek to attract increasingly mobile foreign investment (Keen and 
Konrad 2012). 
 
While these studies are useful in explaining broad cross-country differences in tax outcomes, 
a closely related strand of research has focused on understanding political actors, incentives 
and reform strategies as determinants of specific reform outcomes. This research has 
generally conceptualised the challenge of reform in terms of the need to mobilise political 
forces in favour of reform, while weakening political forces opposed to reform (Fairfield 2010; 
Bates 1989; Ascher 1984). At the root of this research tradition is a focus on the frequently 
significant political barriers to mobilising necessary support for reform. Those who are 
threatened by tax reform (‘the losers’) are generally more concentrated, organised and 
politically influential than the broad groups that stand to benefit from expanded public 
spending or a reduced burden of taxation (Olson 1965; Fairfield 2010, 2013; Bird and Zolt 
2005; Bird 1974). Critically, this resistance not only serves to prevent the reform of tax policy, 
but may equally make it difficult to translate changes in tax policy into changes in de facto tax 
administration and outcomes (Casanegra de Jantscher 1990). 
 
Research has focused in particular on resistance from two sources: business taxpayers and 
the tax administration itself. Among the former, most focus has been on the collective action 
potential of larger businesses, which may also enjoy personal ties to the political and 
administrative leadership (Fairfield 2013; Quinn and Shapiro 1991; Elizondo 1994; Bird 
1992). More recently, a small body of work has noted the potential for well-organised small 
business and shop owners to become mobilised in response to certain types of reform 
(Prichard 2009, 2010b). Meanwhile, growing attention has been paid to the potential for tax 
administrations to emerge as important sites of resistance to reform, with vested interests in 
defending existing ways of doing business, patronage networks and areas of authority and 
autonomy (Varsano 2003; Prichard 2009; Joshi et al. 2012; Fjeldstad 2003, 2005; Devas et 
al. 2001).5 As with other areas of civil service reform, administrators may be able to 
undermine reform through both overt resistance and through non-cooperation with 
implementation (Grindle and Thomas 1991).  
 
Given the expected strength of resistance to tax reform, the core message from this literature 
is the paramount importance of high-level political leadership, alongside high-level leadership 
                                                        
3  Several studies have investigated whether access to foreign assistance may similarly reduce domestic tax effort, but 
existing evidence suggests that any such relationship is highly contingent on domestic factors and other features of the 
aid relationship (Clist and Morrissey 2011; Prichard et al. 2012; Benedek et al. 2012; Gupta et al. 2004). 
4  In this vein, stable parliamentary politics may facilitate tax reform by extending time horizons and facilitating bargaining 
(Levi 1988; Prichard 2009; North and Weingast 1989; Tilly 1992), though econometric evidence on the general 
connection between democracy and taxation has been somewhat inconclusive (Cheibub 1998; Gould and Baker 2002; 
Timmons 2010). 
5 On the question of simple inertia within tax administrations, and resistance to changing ways of doing business, several 
authors have recently explored the difficulty of shifting from rather centralised, coercive, styles of administration towards 
a more decentralised, customer oriented, approach (Bird and Vazquez-Caro 2011; Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 2000; 
Aberbach and Christensen 2007). 
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within the tax administration (IMF 2011; Fairfield 2010; Fjeldstad 2005; Durand and Thorp 
1998; Elizondo 1994; Harberger 1989; Ascher 1989; Morrissey 1995; Bird 2008; Khalilzadeh-
Shirazi and Shah 1991). While research has been able to say little about the origins of such 
political leadership, it has sought to capture strategies for weakening resistance and building 
sustainable support for reform. Fairfield (2013) has gone furthest in exploring strategies for 
overcoming business resistance, highlighting in particular the potential benefits of pushing 
impacts into the future, obfuscating the implications of reform and appealing to norms of 
horizontal equity in order to demobilise resistance and fragment business opposition (see 
also Ascher 1984, 1989; Elizondo 1994; Bird 1992; Prichard 2010a).  
 
Less has been written about strategies for building proactive support for reform, in part 
because pervasive mistrust in government, coupled with uncertainty about reform outcomes, 
has historically made mobilising such support difficult (Ascher 1989; Lledo et al. 2004). That 
said, research has suggested that emphasising reciprocity and horizontal equity can be 
valuable strategies for building pro-reform coalitions (Ascher 1989; Fjeldstad 2004; Bergman 
2002, 2003; Harberger 1989; Fairfield 2013; Prichard 2010a, 2010b). Beyond that general 
guidance, Bates (1989: 490) has offered the useful reminder that because of the diverse 
nature of relevant interests, ‘no general formulas for success can be valid. Rather, what is 
needed is highly specific political knowledge, and of a rather specific kind: of the groups in 
society, their interests and the way in which they can - and cannot – combine’. 
1.2 Historical institutions, tax bargains and political settlements 
 
Whereas the works discussed so far have largely focused on understanding interests, 
incentives and political dynamics shaping specific reform efforts, an alternative tradition has 
emphasised the historical durability of key features of tax systems. It has sought to explain 
these long-term differences in tax systems as emerging from slow-changing institutions and 
durable political bargains, which are ‘symptomatic’ of broader state-society relations and 
relations among competing elite groups (Martin et al. 2009; Di John 2010). In this view tax 
systems can thus be seen as emerging from often implicit ‘bargains’ between competing 
groups, and most often between the state and large taxpayers (Tilly 1992; Lieberman 2003; 
Schneider 2012; Luong and Weinthal 2004).  
 
The role of institutions in shaping tax systems has been emphasised most clearly by Sven 
Steinmo (1993), who studied the role of formal electoral and legislative institutions in shaping 
tax systems in OECD countries. Lledo et al. (2004:9) have applied a similar logic to studying 
developing countries, but cast the net more broadly, arguing that ‘tax systems are 
understood to emerge from the pressures of social forces, but only after they have been 
filtered by formal and informal institutions of the state’ [emphasis added]. This is consistent 
with growing attention in developing countries to the importance of informal institutions, 
which Helmke and Levitsky (2004: 727), define as ‘socially shared, usually unwritten, and 
created, communicated and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels’.  
 
Recent scholarship has gone a step further in arguing that specific outcomes can be 
understood as the product of broader, often implicit, bargains and understanding among 
political and economic elites. This idea is most closely associated within the recent work of 
North et al. (2009) who introduce the concept of a ‘social order’ to capture the overarching 
rules and elite bargains governing the distribution of political and economic resources in a 
given society. They characterise low-income countries as ‘limited access orders’ in which the 
distribution of resources is hierarchically organised, and regulated by elite groups. As Khan 
explains, these overarching bargains ensure that ‘the distribution of benefits is consistent 
with the distribution of power in society’, and thus provide a framework for predictably sharing 
rents and maintaining stability (Khan 2010: 18).6 While conceptually complex, the core 
                                                        
6  North et al. (2009) describe this equilibrium as a ‘double balance’.  
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message is straightforward: specific tax outcomes are likely to be shaped not only by easily 
recognisable institutions, but by informal bargains among elite groups, and by the broader 
norms and networks governing elite interactions.  
1.3 An integrated framework 
 
Recent scholarship has increasingly adopted the concept of a ‘social order’ or political 
settlement to describe durable, and comparatively institutionalised, bargains and norms 
governing the distribution of rents among elite groups.7 This language has usefully drawn 
attention to the frequent strength and persistence of informal ‘rules of the game’ shaping 
development outcomes. However, the concept of a political settlement or social order also 
risks implying a misleading degree of permanence and institutionalisation, while obfuscating 
the role of agency in continuously reshaping the existing rules of the game. As Bates has 
written of North et al.’s (2009) framework, ‘This reader, at least, is surprised by the limited 
role that micro-level reasoning plays in their arguments’ (Bates 2010: 755). With this in mind, 
the following analysis seeks to combine an analysis of long-lived informal institutions and 
political bargains with a focus on the micro-level politics surrounding specific tax outcomes.  
 
The first part of the analysis correspondingly focuses on capturing key features of the 
political settlement, as reflected in the relatively durable political bargains, formal and 
informal institutions and informal networks that have underpinned key features of the tax 
system over several decades. This provides broad insights into the ways in which the 
existing system serves the interests of powerful constituencies, and into the frequently 
informal rules governing existing practices. The second part of the analysis then turns to 
providing a more micro-level view of the politics of specific episodes of tax reform. This 
allows us to move beyond a static analysis of the broad political forces shaping long-term tax 
outcomes, and towards an understanding of the strategies employed by competing groups in 
negotiating and renegotiating both specific reform and the broader rules governing the 
systems. By combining these two alternative approaches to understanding the politics of tax 
reform, we are thus able to capture the remarkable durability of the informal institutions, 
norms and networks governing the tax system, but are also able to capture the political 
dynamics underpinning this durability – and the consequent potential for unexpected political 
realignment and the creation of new opportunities for reform.8 
2 Tax reform and the tax system in 
Bangladesh 
 
Despite the obvious political barriers to reform, significant, if incomplete, policy and 
administrative reforms have taken root across much of the developing world, and particularly 
in Africa and Latin America (Keen 2013). By contrast, reform has been much more halting 
and incomplete across South Asia, while this has been particularly true of Bangladesh. 
Despite repeated reform initiatives revenue collection has remained stubbornly low, while the 
administrative system has continued to be largely manual and characterised by high levels of 
discretion and corruption.  
                                                        
7  This has been particularly common in writing about Bangladesh, where informal political norms and bargains have 
played an unusually consistent and important role in shaping governance and economic growth (Khan 2008a, 2010, 
2011, 2013; Hassan 2012; Ahmed et al. forthcoming).  
8  One of the most notable weaknesses of analysis focused on political settlements is that it implies a permanence that is 
inconsistent with the history of unexpected economic reform in low-income countries.  Economic reform has frequently 
appeared politically impossible beforehand owing to the alignment of political forces against it, only for political 
realignment to make seemingly impossible reform a reality. The framework here correspondingly seeks to capture the 
potential for both long-term continuity and sudden change (Bates 1989; Ascher 1989; Thirsk 1997; Roe 1994; Grindle 
and Thomas 1991; Haggard and Webb 1993). 
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2.1 Weaknesses of the tax system 
 
While the share of tax collection in GDP is an imperfect indicator of the quality of tax 
systems, Table 1 highlights the relative weakness of the tax system in Bangladesh relative to 
other countries in the region. While a modest uptick in revenue is apparent in recent years, 
Bangladesh’s National Board of Revenue (NBR) continues to be characterised by a weak 
policy framework, very limited administrative modernisation, a high degree of administrative 
fragmentation, significant human resource constraints and weak enforcement mechanisms. 
 
Table 1 Tax revenue as % of GDP: comparing South Asian countries 
 
 
 
Note: Data for India is for general government, owing to its federal revenue system. All other countries based on central 
government data, as sub-national revenue data is incomplete and negligible. 
 
Source: ICTD revenue database. 
 
The most basic challenge has been the overall weakness of the policy framework, which is 
characterised by an enormous range of exemptions, incentives and special regimes. These 
range from the existence of simplified regimes associated with VAT, to significant scope 
within the law for tax officials and political elites to grant comparatively discretionary benefits. 
This directly undermines revenue collection, but equally complicates administration, 
undermines equity in the system and introduces significant scope for officials to exercise 
discretion in both policy and administration.  
 
This space for discretion within the tax law is closely linked to the broader challenge of very 
limited administrative modernisation. Most tax systems in low-income countries have sought 
to progressively increase reliance on self-reported tax returns, voluntary compliance and risk 
based auditing, with at least some success (Bird and Vazquez-Caro 2011). By contrast, NBR 
has maintained an outdated ‘control’ based system, which relies on the physical monitoring 
of taxpayers in order to enforce compliance. This is reflected, among other things, in 
extremely low levels of automation, and has allowed NBR officials to retain enormous 
discretion and, in turn, opportunities for collusion with, or extraction from, taxpayers.  
 
The discretion enjoyed by tax officials, as well as the overall inefficiency of data management 
within the NBR, has been exacerbated by a high degree of administrative fragmentation. 
Whereas there has been a trend across low-income countries towards greater integration 
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across administrative units,9 the NBR remains divided into three highly autonomous 
divisions: direct tax, VAT and customs. The relative absence of data sharing across 
departments severely undermines administration, and opens space for collusion, 
arbitrariness and abuse, while fragmentation also creates additional costs for taxpayers. 
 
These challenges have been consistently underpinned by significant human resource 
constraints within the NBR. Hiring is subject to the common constraints of civil service 
recruitment through the Public Service Commission, making timely hiring very difficult and 
the hiring of staff with the specialised skills necessary for modern tax administration 
extremely rare. This is in contrast to the trend elsewhere in the developing world towards 
semi-autonomous revenue authorities, with greater flexibility over hiring decisions (Kloeden 
2011; Devas et al. 2001; Fjeldstad and Moore 2008). This has been exacerbated by a legal 
battle that sharply constrained hiring to the VAT and customs departments from the early 
1980s until 2011. This resulted in only slightly more than half of nearly 5,000 allocated 
positions being filled as recently as 2008, while poorly qualified staff have been promoted to 
officer positions in the absence of new hiring. 
 
Finally, even where tax assessment has been effective, enforcement mechanisms have been 
weak. This has in part reflected the ability of large taxpayers to use political influence to 
avoid enforcement efforts, but has also resulted from dysfunction within the judicial system. 
The lower levels of the appeals process are characterised by widespread corruption, while 
cases that escalate to the high court are subject to processing delays lasting several years or 
longer. The latter has offered an informal means to delay or avoid tax payments, as no taxes 
are collected while cases are pending – and no steps had been taken to reduce the backlog 
of cases as of the time of writing. 
 
The end result of these weaknesses is a tax system characterised by an extremely high 
degree of informality and discretion, and by the corresponding prevalence of negotiated tax 
liabilities. While large businesses submit tax returns to the government, they are emphatic 
that these tax returns represent merely a starting point for subsequent negotiations with tax 
officials. Over time most firms accept this reality, and enter into implicit agreements with tax 
officials that involve regular informal payments and the informal negotiation of liabilities 
between tax officials, lawyers and auditors, sometimes collectively referred to as the ‘trinity’ 
or ‘tri-party syndicate’. These agreements are periodically destabilised, particularly when 
officials are re-assigned, thus initiating new rounds of negotiation around tax liabilities and 
informal payments. This basic pattern is repeated for smaller firms, though on a much more 
constant basis, owing to regular interaction between tax collectors and firms within the 
manual, control based, system of administration.10 While accounting and audit firms 
nominally verify tax declarations, they are largely passive participants in these broader 
informal processes, merely affirming the outcomes of informal negotiations.11 Put most 
simply, it is thus a system with an unusually expansive scope for politicisation, collusion and 
corruption. 
  
                                                        
9 This has been reflected in the push towards the creation of integrated revenue authorities, as well as a push towards 
reorganisation according to function rather than tax type. The latter push has advanced most rapidly in the creation of 
Large Taxpayer Units (LTUs), but improved data sharing and integration is equally a broader goal (Kloeden 2011; Baer 
et al. 2002). 
10  This description is based on repeated in-depth interviews with a broad cross-section of businesses focused on 
understanding taxpaying experiences. These interviews were carried out as part of research supported by the World 
Bank in April-June 2011. 
11  Multinational accounting firms are generally felt to be comparatively excluded from these informal processes. In part for 
this reason, the vast majority of firms rely on domestic audit firms, with many routinely paying small fees in order to have 
fake audit certification provided by less reputable firms. 
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2.2 Repeated failures of reform 
 
While these limitations of the existing system are significant, they are not uncommon in low-
income countries. The most notable feature of experiences in Bangladesh is thus not the 
nature of the challenges, but the near total absence of reform despite widespread 
acknowledgement of the problems. Whereas major tax reform has occurred across much of 
the developing world in recent decades, the same problems have persisted for decades in 
Bangladesh despite almost continuous reform efforts, often fuelled and funded by external 
donors.  
 
The most striking examples lie in areas where reform is technically straightforward, and 
demands only political leadership to implement reform. This is most notably true of human 
resource policies, where dramatic shortfalls in the hiring of skilled staff have continued for 
more than two decades, thus critically undermining administration and reform. While hiring 
problems have been explained as the result of unresolvable legal battles, the astonishing 
scale and duration of the problem speaks to broader political barriers. In similar fashion, 
encouraging even the most basic cooperation and data sharing across the different tax 
departments is overwhelmingly a question of political leadership, but has gone unaddressed 
since the early 1990s. 
 
More broadly, the past two decades are littered with unimplemented reform programmes, 
often with external financial backing. The first major policy reform measure came with the 
introduction of VAT in 1991 but, as discussed below, the new tax was never implemented in 
the form that was initially envisioned. Meanwhile, income tax legislation still dates to the 
Income Tax Ordinance 1984, promulgated under military rule. Over time it has become 
characterised by a huge range of exemptions introduced by way of difficult to monitor 
Statutory Regulatory Orders (SROs), while there has until recently been no sustained effort 
to reform the underlying law or rationalise relevant legislation.  
 
On the administrative side, a procession of donor-supported projects have been initiated 
since the late 1990s, but these projects have been characterised by a repeated pattern of 
long delays and major financial outlays with few deliverable results. This is most clearly 
reflected in a series of projects beginning with the World Bank-supported Customs 
Administration Modernization (CAM) project, initiated in 1999. The CAM project was to be the 
first phase of a nine-year Revenue Administration Modernization Program (RAMP), and 
enjoyed some modest success early on despite the widely recognised absence of significant 
political leadership (Draper 2001). However, in the years to follow the programme was 
repeatedly delayed and scaled back. For example, new ASYCUDA++ software was never 
fully implemented or rolled out to all of the intended customs posts. Meanwhile the 
implementation of Pre-Shipment Inspection (PSI) for imports was piecemeal and incomplete, 
and was periodically plagued by accusations of manipulation and ineffective 
implementation.12 
 
Despite these problems, the second phase of the original reform programme – the 
Modernization and Automation Program (MAP) – was designed and initiated in 2005, with 
many of the same goals as the earlier CAM project (Mozumder 2012). The MAP was 
scheduled to run until 2009, eventually giving way to a further phase of the programme – the 
Tax Administration Modernization Project (TAMP) (World Bank 2006). However, this further 
phase of the project was dropped owing to the poor performance of the earlier programme. 
Meanwhile, the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) introduced a parallel 
                                                        
12 While the limited implementation of PSI was initially successful, over time efforts to extend the reach of PSI have faced 
increasing resistance and interference from local customs officials. They have, for example, frequently insisted on 
inspecting cargo that has already been through a PSI (TIB 2011), while there are also claims that certificates issued by 
PSI firms have been open to manipulation (Uzzaman and Yusuf 2011). 
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Reforms in Revenue Administration (RIRA) project, which was similarly not renewed after 
2008 owing to poor performance.  
 
Since 2008 Bangladesh has faced mounting concern about long-term fiscal management, 
which has motivated increased demands from donors for more aggressive tax reform efforts. 
These demands have focused on the implementation of a major VAT reform, with a 
secondary focus on reform of the Income Tax Act. Both reform measures have become 
formal conditions for new IMF lending. In response to this external pressure and the 
mounting need for additional resources, the government put in place plans to introduce new 
VAT and Income Tax legislation. However, as is discussed in greater detail later in the paper, 
these reform measures have again been repeatedly postponed and altered, as the 
government has sought to secure the release of much-needed IMF funds while minimising 
the extent of actual reform (The Financial Express 2011; The Daily Star 2012a). Meanwhile, 
donor support for administrative reform has continued in a piecemeal fashion, with gains 
continuing to be very limited.14 
 
What is most striking about this picture is not simply the weakness of the tax system but the 
repeated failure of even relatively straightforward reform efforts, many of which have been 
successfully undertaken in other low-income countries. That this has occurred despite 
significant external pressure for reform speaks not merely to the limits of internal capacity, 
but to sustained resistance to reform from a broad range of stakeholders. The remainder of 
this analysis correspondingly seeks to account for the broad failure of reform, while shedding 
light on potential spaces for change. 
3 Informal institutions and the political logic 
of the tax system 
 
Up to a point the weakness of tax reform efforts is not surprising. Tax reform is almost never 
politically popular, and many taxpayers are likely to welcome weak revenue collection. 
However, the type of pervasive discretion and corruption observed in Bangladesh could 
reasonably be expected to generate incentives for at least moderate reform both to raise 
additional revenue and to increase predictability. This is the pattern that has been witnessed 
in a wide range of developing countries in recent years. 
 
In order to understand why this has not been the case, we begin by describing the broad 
interests of the two most prominent sources of resistance to reform – the tax administration 
and the business community. However, we argue that the interests of these groups taken in 
isolation do not provide an adequate explanation for the absence of reform. Instead, the 
persistence of existing practices reflects the existence of long-standing informal institutions, 
norms and networks that have shaped de facto outcomes and made the existing systems 
mutually beneficial to powerful political, economic and administrative actors. 
3.1 Bureaucratic resistance, rigidity and politicisation 
 
At a broad level, resistance to reform from within the NBR is not surprising. NBR officials 
enjoy a large degree of autonomy and substantial discretionary power under the status quo. 
This opens the door to systemic corruption that is organised and sanctioned at every level of 
                                                        
14  A notable example surrounds the introduction of online tax filing, which after two years had only been extended to two 
neighbourhoods in Dhaka and, more strikingly, saw only 24 users file taxes online during the most recent year. 
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the administration.15 As such, many within the NBR are strongly resistant to any reform 
programme that would reduce their autonomy and discretionary power, including through 
increased transparency. The strength of bureaucratic resistance is consistent with patterns 
elsewhere in the civil service (Huque and Rahman 2003). 
 
However, resistance to reform is not uniform. The senior leadership, made up of the 
appointed chairman and board members, has traditionally been comparatively reformist in 
their orientation. They are specifically chosen to be the public face of the agency, while they 
are generally near retirement and removed from day-to-day administration. This has given 
them a stronger incentive to adopt more reformist positions. However, despite occupying 
nominally powerful positions, in practice these senior officials have lacked sufficient authority 
to lead genuine reform. 
 
By contrast, senior levels of the front line administration are widely viewed as being aligned 
against reform. The deputy commissioners in particular are consistently acknowledged in 
interviews as being at the centre of day-to-day networks of corruption, with the 
commissioners identified as overseeing these activities. They are able to exercise significant 
influence over administrative performance, and thus over de facto support for, or resistance 
to, reform.  
 
The rank and file of the NBR are an entrenched source of resistance to reform, as is the case 
in much of the developing world (Fjeldstad 2005; Therkildsen 2004; Devas et al. 2001). 
These officials are at the front line of networks of corruption and informal bargaining, and 
those lacking the technical skills to adapt to automation view reform as a threat. 
Administrative resistance has correspondingly been aimed at preventing redundancy, limiting 
new hiring and new skill requirements, and blocking the implementation of effective 
performance monitoring systems.  
3.2 Business resistance and reform 
 
The most important resistance to reform has come from the business community, which has 
at various times been explicitly cited by the government as the reason for altering or 
abandoning reform initiatives.16 As described in more detail below, the business community 
has been extremely successful in lobbying for delayed implementation, special treatment and 
other loopholes even when confronted by formal policy reform. 
 
Formally, business engagement occurs through business associations, with the Federation 
of Bangladesh Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FBCCI) at their apex. Lobbying is 
equally carried out bilaterally by powerful firms, as there are close links between political 
officials and business leaders, with the latter making generous political contributions and 
often represented directly in politics.17 These large business associations have publicly 
expressed significant support for reform focused on simplifying procedures, establishing non-
governmental dispute resolution processes and reducing some of the discretionary power 
exercised by tax officials. However, in private support has been much more limited. Business 
associations have jealously guarded the significant array of exemptions, special regimes and 
informal benefits that they currently enjoy, and this has created resistance to any major 
                                                        
15  This has been most systematically documented by Transparency International Bangladesh in a study that received 
significant attention among public officials (TIB 2011). 
16 As discussed at greater length below, the government explicitly pointed to business resistance as the justification for 
abandoning plans for a new VAT law in 2011 (The Financial Express 2011). 
17 By one estimate, 50 to 75 owners of Ready Made Garment (RMG) companies have become members of parliament 
(MPs) at different times (Rashid 2008). A more recent estimate is that 35 MPs in the current parliament (i.e. 10% of all 
MPs) are RMG owners (New York Times 2012), while an alternative estimate puts the number at 29 (Ahmed et al. 
forthcoming). 
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renovation of the existing policy framework.18 More informally, many firms have been equally 
reluctant to see any dramatic reduction in the politicisation, permeability and corruption of tax 
administration. While these elements can be a source of tension and unpredictability, for 
those with strong political relationships they can also be a means to reduce tax liabilities 
significantly and increase predictability. 
 
While both large and small firms have opposed reform, both their priorities and political 
strategies have differed. Larger firms have been most concerned with defending existing 
incentives, exemptions and special regimes – contained in the Income Tax and VAT Acts – 
as well as informal practices that serve to reduce the effective tax burden. Their lobbying has 
been grounded in financial support for both leading parties, and in close relationships 
between political and economic elites. Unsurprisingly, firms that enjoy the most extensive 
benefits under the current system – including those in the RMG sector – have led lobbying 
efforts, while other firms have been comparatively marginalised. By partial contrast, small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs) have been more consistently mobilised in opposition to 
VAT, out of a fear of improved enforcement and increased compliance costs. This reflects 
their small size and frequent informality, and has been reflected in success in pushing for 
retention of a widely applied presumptive tax regime for small firms. Unlike larger firms, their 
political influence is grounded in their potential for collective action, with the retail and 
wholesale sectors in particular being well organised nationally and capable of generating 
political and economic instability.  
3.3 Political elites, informal networks and the prevailing equilibrium 
 
The story told thus far resembles standard explanations of the difficulty of tax reform: 
entrenched and unified resistance among business taxpayers and tax administrators has 
made reform politically untenable. However, on closer inspection this simple story quickly 
appears incomplete. It fails to account convincingly for the near total absence of business 
support for reform despite the pervasiveness of informality, discretion and corruption in 
administration. Equally, it fails to explain effectively the absence of political leadership for 
reform in the face of very limited public revenue, increasing fiscal pressure and consistent 
external pressure for reform. It is therefore necessary to move beyond an atomistic account 
of individual interest groups in order to capture the interconnectedness of elite interests and 
the informal norms and networks that have ensured shared benefits from the existing 
system.  
3.3.1 Informality, predictability and political neutrality: business and the existing 
settlement 
 
The first issue left unexplained by the simple story told so far is the near total absence of 
business pressure for reform given the depth of corruption and discretion within the tax 
administration. While firms stand to benefit from collusion with tax officials to lower tax 
liabilities, the informality of the existing system exposes them to significant risk of periodic 
harassment, extraction and uncertainty. It equally opens the door to politically motivated 
extraction, as political elites may exploit the informality of the existing system to benefit 
political allies and attack rivals.19 Given highly charged partisan political competition, 
Bangladesh’s tax system appears on the surface to be well beyond the point at which the 
potential benefits of collusion are outweighed by the cost of additional uncertainty. 
 
                                                        
18 This resistance has been driven particularly by the Bangladesh Garments Manufacturers and Exporters Association 
(BGMEA), Bangladesh Knitwear Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BKMEA) and various associations of poultry 
farm owners. 
19  This is an issue that is widely recognised in low-income contexts, but has not been the subject of focused academic 
study. It has, though, been a particularly common feature of studies of the exercise of political power in post-Soviet 
states (see, for example, Ledeneva 2006: 91-103, 142-158).  
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Why, then, has there not been more support for reform? The answer lies in the fact that while 
corruption is extremely widespread, it has also been generally predictable, kept within 
manageable bounds and free of the effects of partisan political competition. This 
predictability is critical, as a significant body of research has shown that the negative effects 
of corruption on economic growth are vastly reduced when corruption is predictable. In these 
cases firms are able to treat corruption simply as an additional, predictable, cost of doing 
business (Wei 2000; Wedeman 1997; Campos et al. 1999). In Bangladesh these costs are, 
in the view of most firms, outweighed by the benefits of predictability and low effective rates, 
thus making the status quo relatively effective – this is reflected in the fact that Bangladesh 
ranks better than any of its larger neighbours in the ‘Paying Taxes’ component of the World 
Bank’s Doing Business indicators. 
 
While the attractiveness of the existing system to businesses is thus apparent, the greater 
mystery lies in understanding how and why this predictability has been maintained despite 
obvious potential for politicisation and abuse. As noted at the outset, Bangladesh has long 
been home to highly adversarial political competition and a highly politicised bureaucracy. It 
is correspondingly surprising both that the tax system has not been regularly used as an 
instrument of partisan political competition, and that the exercise of discretion by the 
bureaucracy has remained regularised and measured.  
 
Part of the answer lies in the existence of strong informal norms and networks governing tax 
administration. At the level of day-to-day operations, corruption and negotiation is subject to 
relatively centralised oversight by deputy commissioners and commissioners, thus serving to 
discipline and regularise front line practices. This centralisation is critical, as it shifts the 
analytical lens from decentralised, and unpredictable, corruption to hierarchically organised 
informal networks managing rents within the NBR.  
 
However, the more important part of the explanation lies in understanding the motivation of 
the political leadership. While Bangladesh is home to highly adversarial partisan political 
competition, both political parties have informally agreed that the search for political rents 
should not impinge on the primacy of supporting continued economic growth, and the 
creation of economic rents for key actors in the private sector. Despite highly antagonistic 
political competition there is a strong commitment to rent sharing in the economic sphere, 
with continued economic growth serving to expand the size of the economic pie and defend 
the entrenched position of the two leading political parties (Khan 2010, 2011; Hassan 2012). 
Consistent with this logic, most firms maintain a good relationship with both leading political 
parties, including making financial contributions to both sides. The same ethos of equitable 
rent sharing is apparent among senior tax officials, who explain that it would be unfair for the 
tax administration to target particular firms, as this would destroy its prospects relative to its 
competitors.  
3.3.2 Rent allocation, economic growth and political patronage: political elites and 
the existing settlement 
 
The second issue left insufficiently explained by the analysis so far is the absence of a 
stronger push for reform by the political leadership, despite extremely low levels of revenue 
collection with which to finance government programmes and patronage networks. The 
explanation lies in a political leadership torn between two alternative objectives. On one 
hand, parts of the political leadership have demonstrated a genuine desire for reform and 
have, at times, taken concrete steps to pursue that goal.20 These reformers have been 
motivated both by recognition of the value of increased revenue collection for financing both 
improved public services and the broader patronage networks on which they rely. On the 
                                                        
20  As discussed in greater detail below, the years since 2009 in particular have seen a range of incremental reforms 
initiated. More broadly, many NBR chairmen and ministers of finance have shown a desire to lead on reform, but have 
been stifled in those efforts. 
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other hand, political leaders are not only constrained by the strength of organised resistance, 
but have come to benefit from the existing tax system. The informality of the system allows it 
to serve an important political function as a conduit for distributing patronage, as a source of 
funding for the political leadership and as a means to preserve and support continued 
economic growth. On balance this combination of political constraints and political benefits 
has outweighed the desire for reform, as leaders have opted for the certainty of the current 
system rather than the uncertainty of change.  
 
In order to understand the ways in which the existing tax system has served the interests of 
political elites it is necessary first to understand the organisation of political influence and 
control within the NBR itself. The tax administration is formally home to four civil service 
associations, which have historically wielded important influence in resisting reform 
initiatives.21 However, the more telling development has been the progressive superseding of 
these associations by informal groups that cut across hierarchy, cadre and political party. 
These informal groups have enjoyed high level political support – reaching as high as the 
Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) – which has allowed them to wield increasing power over 
hiring and promotion decisions.22 Consistent with the discussion so far, these groups have 
been essentially non-partisan. They have developed close ties to both political parties, with 
changes in political leadership generally leading to changes in the leadership of these 
informal networks, but not to broader changes in their role and organisation. Instead, they 
have drawn their strength and organisation from their ability to distribute financial and 
professional rewards efficiently, while serving the interests of the political leadership. 
 
The power of these informal groups is reflected in limited hiring of skilled younger staff, the 
politicisation of internal transfers and promotions, and the fact that NBR staffing was stuck at 
only about 50 per cent of permitted levels as late as 2011. This influence over hiring and 
transfer decisions has allowed these informal networks to solidify their power progressively, 
while gaining influence through increasing control over centralised patronage and corruption 
networks. Meanwhile, the chairman of the NBR, the nominal leader of reform efforts, has 
been correspondingly marginalised. A remarkable twenty-six separate chairmen were 
appointed in the first thirty-eight years of the NBR’s existence. This has reflected control of 
the appointments process by the political leadership – despite legal provisions calling for 
internal appointment by the NBR Board – and the repeated removal of chairmen who 
pursued policies that challenged the interests of the Ministry of Finance (MOF), PMO or 
powerful business groups (TIB 2011).  
 
The overall administrative environment has thus been one in which the de jure roles and 
responsibilities of officials have been largely supplanted by de facto power and authority. 
This been based on close links between informal groups within the administration and the 
highest levels of politics, in a pattern that has matched developments elsewhere within the 
state (CGS 2006; IGS 2008). Far from aggressively pushing for reform in the face of 
entrenched resistance, sections of the political elite, led by the PMO, have benefitted directly 
from the centralised networks of patronage and corruption within the NBR. These 
connections have served to generate regular funds for political elites, while allowing political 
leaders to dispense patronage and rents to leading economic actors. 
  
This last point speaks to the importance of direct informal ties linking political elites to leaders 
within the business community. The business community – and particularly large firms in 
leading sectors like Ready Made Garments – has acted as a key source of political support 
and political funding for the political leadership. As noted above, they have offered political 
support and funding across partisan lines. Rather than competing to elect one or the other 
                                                        
21 The Executive Associations, the Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS) Kar (tax) Association, Customs Cadre and Excise, the 
Non Cadre Inspectors Association and the Ministerial Staff Association. 
22  This is a pattern also seen elsewhere in the Bangladesh civil service, as documented by Huque and Rahman (2003).  
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political party to power, large businesses have sought the continuation of the broader status 
quo. This status quo has tested the ability of political leaders from both parties to offer 
consistent support to leading firms and sectors, and to sustain high levels of economic 
growth. The ability of political elites to exercise informal influence over senior officials within 
NBR has, in turn, been critical to this relationship, as the tax system has been an important 
conduit for delivering economic benefits, and retaining business support.  
 
On the surface it appears that reforming the tax system towards a rules-based system, with 
uniformly low tax rates, could achieve the same objectives as the current system. It could 
provide predictability and low tax rates to firms, while raising additional revenue and 
significantly reducing informality and uncertainty. However, this analysis fails to recognise the 
broader political role of the existing system, or the uncertainty that the transition to a more 
formal system would imply. The existing system offers the political leadership control over 
the distribution of patronage and economic rents through the tax system. In exchange, 
leading businesses have offered political support and financing that cuts across partisan 
lines, while control of networks of corruption within NBR has made the tax system itself an 
important conduit for political financing. Although all actors view the current system as 
imperfect, it is a compromise that has minimally delivered both economic growth and relative 
political stability. As such, both political and economic elites appear reluctant to confront the 
uncertainty, in terms of tax burdens and political alignment, implied by deeper reform.23 This 
story closely mirrors broader accounts of Bangladesh’s governance, which have similarly 
emphasised the role of informal institutions in shaping economic and political outcomes. By 
ensuring the predictable distribution of benefits among political and economic elites, these 
informal rules of the game have ensured relative political stability and economic growth 
despite high corruption and dysfunctional formal governance (Khan 2011, 2013; Hassan 
2012; Ahmed et al. forthcoming). 
4 Negotiating reform: the case of VAT reform 
efforts 
 
The description so far captures the broad contours of the politics governing the tax system 
over several decades. Following existing literature it is correspondingly possible to think of 
this system as the outcome of an informal political settlement among powerful interests. 
However, while such a conceptualisation highlights the persistence of a set of largely 
informal rules of the game, it obscures the role of political agency in explaining both the 
persistence of the system and the potential for change (Bates 2010). While key features of 
the system have been long-lived, this does not imply that these arrangements have been 
static. Key features of the system have been regularly contested and renegotiated, with 
continuity maintained through the strategic choices of key actors. By looking at specific 
instances of tax reform it is possible to capture these political dynamics, and thus to highlight 
the process of both continuity and change in response to external pressure and shifts in 
domestic political power. 
 
To this end, the remaining analysis is focused on a detailed exploration of two prominent, 
and related, reform episodes: the original introduction of VAT in 1991, and subsequent 
efforts to reform the existing VAT since 2009.24 The analysis aims to highlight three elements 
                                                        
23 Ascher (1989: 464), for example, writes that: ‘The frequently negative “reflex” reaction to a new tax reform initiative on 
the part of many groups is typically due not just to expected losses but also to the risk of incurring costs that cannot be 
anticipated’. 
24  These are not, of course, the only examples one could choose: despite the persistent lack of major reform, more 
modest reform has been a regular feature of the tax landscape (Government of Bangladesh Planning Commission 
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not touched on by the discussion so far. First, the important role played by international 
actors in generating pressure for reform. External pressure has the potential to disrupt 
existing political bargains among domestic actors, and we thus seek to capture the process 
by which the government has bargained with international actors while protecting its core 
domestic interests. Second, the specific strategies adopted by the government – and other 
actors – in seeking to negotiate incremental reform within the context of existing informal 
rules, norms and networks. Finally, the ways in which unexpected political events have 
opened new spaces for reform by disrupting key features of the existing political bargain 
around taxation. 
4.1 The 1991 VAT reform 
 
The original introduction of VAT was initiated in the 1980s under the military government of 
General Ershad. It was a response to perilously low levels of revenue collection, which stood 
at only 7 per cent of GDP, and to consequent pressure from the IMF, which pushed for a 
highly simplified VAT regime that would maximise administrative simplicity. Operating under 
external pressure, and fearing resistance from a growing pro-democracy movement, the 
reform effort was characterised by extreme secrecy from the outset. The design of the law 
was handled by a small group of officials from the NBR and Ministry of Finance, along with a 
handful of business leaders, while drafting was carried out in secret by a group of university 
students, supervised by an IMF economist of Bangladeshi origin. 
 
The reform effort was briefly derailed by the victory of the pro-democracy movement, but the 
democratically elected Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) (1991-96) quickly agreed to 
revive reform under continued prodding from the IMF. However, despite the change in 
government, drafting remained highly secretive apart from a modest expansion in large 
business representation. As such, most businesses and members of the NBR only became 
aware of the proposed reform when the draft law was rapidly prepared for implementation 
and placed before the national parliament. Consistent with government fears, significant 
resistance immediately emerged from both businesses and segments of the NBR. The 
opposition Awami League (AL) party in turn attempted to capitalise on the anti-government 
sentiment, going as far as to threaten hartal (general shutdown) unless the VAT law was 
abolished.  
 
The government responded by seeking a strategy that could simultaneously satisfy powerful 
local constituencies as well as IMF demands for reform. In practice it was able to do so by 
drawing on both formal and informal bargains with key stakeholders in reaching a mutually 
acceptable compromise. The Awami League was persuaded to quieten its opposition after 
significant lobbying by the reform leadership, and by the World Bank and IMF. It feared being 
branded irresponsible and ‘anti-market’ following its defeat in earlier elections, while its 
willingness to compromise was equally an early example of aggressive partisan political 
competition being moderated in order to manage key areas of economic regulation. 
Meanwhile, the political leadership relied on its clientelistic relationship with the elite 
leadership of the Federation of Bangladesh Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FBCCI) in 
order to solicit a formal statement of support for the reform. Informal norms and networks 
again appear to have been critical in persuading large businesses that their interests would 
be protected following reform, whether formally or informally.  
 
Having reached agreement with these larger actors, the government pursued a series of 
more explicit compromises in order to address persistent resistance from the broader 
business community and from front line NBR officials. Small and medium business, 
particularly in the wholesale and retail sectors, wielded the potential to mobilise disruptive 
                                                        
2011; Chowdhury 2005; TIB 2011). However, the two VAT reform efforts offer particularly high-profile illustrations of the 
broader dynamics of reform. 
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protests and, at the extreme, violence. They were placated with the introduction of the so-
called ‘package system’, which offered small firms a simplified tax regime that would 
effectively guarantee lower tax burdens and expanded scope for negotiation with tax officials. 
Meanwhile, NBR officials were granted various concessions allowing them to retain a degree 
of discretion and control through, for example, continued requirements that prices used in 
calculating VAT liabilities had to be approved by tax officials. More importantly, NBR officials 
successfully resisted efforts aimed at reorganising or modernising the administration by 
drawing on their high-level political patrons to defend the administrative status quo. 
 
However, the most important compromise lay in an agreement to implement the 1991 reform 
gradually, and with a multiplicity of rates and special regimes. This stands in sharp contrast 
to the majority of low-income countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, where VAT has 
been implemented comparatively rapidly and with fewer exceptions.25 The new VAT was 
initially applied to only large manufacturing and export industries, both of which were large 
enough to cope with reporting requirements and had limited liabilities owing to the export of 
most of their production. Subsequent expansion of VAT coverage was consistently delayed, 
while the government continued to maintain, and selectively add, special regimes and 
exemptions. Despite constant pressure from the IMF and World Bank, it was 2004 before 
VAT coverage had been expanded to all major sectors, and by that time the range of 
exemptions and discretion that had been added to the law left it resembling the initially 
envisioned VAT in name only. 
 
This reliance on incremental reform has been a regular feature of government reform efforts, 
and is best understood as a political strategy for reconciling competing interests. Delayed 
implementation allowed the government to get the law passed and satisfy external actors, 
but businesses equally understood that this implied a longer time horizon over which to 
continue to lobby for delays and exceptions. Put more simply, it created opportunities for a 
divergence between de jure policy and de facto realities on the ground, both through 
incomplete implementation and the gradual proliferation of exemptions. As with other areas 
of reform, this compromise was made possible by an implicit understanding among elites that 
core business interests would be defended over time, particularly at the level of 
implementation. This implicit understanding was, in turn, made possible by the informal 
norms and networks that underpinned the broader tax system. 
4.2 VAT reform effort since 2009 
 
Owing to the variety of exceptions and exemptions that came to characterise the 1991 VAT 
law, it failed to achieve either the revenue productivity or the economic efficiency that had 
motivated its initial introduction. The result was mounting international pressure to introduce 
a new law, free of many of the existing compromises. As fiscal pressures facing the country 
mounted, these demands for reform culminated in the IMF making the introduction of a new 
VAT law a prominent condition for the negotiation of a new US$1 billion loan. The tax reform 
process was initiated by the Ministry of Finance in 2009, and has seen the government seek 
to negotiate competing reform demands by using many of the same strategies employed 
during the previous VAT reform process. 
 
As with the previous process, the initial drafting of the law was undertaken in relative 
secrecy, and led by a local consulting firm, the Policy Research Institute (PRI). The project 
was led by the same ex-IMF local expert who had led the drafting of the 1991 VAT law, 
supported by two international consultants who had been involved with the drafting of New 
Zealand’s highly simplified VAT law. The government insisted throughout that the new VAT 
law would be passed as part of the 2012 budget process, and would then be followed by a 
                                                        
25  The commonality of reform measures across low-income countries, generally following the broader outlines of IMF 
advice, has led Fjeldstad and Moore (2008: 236), for example, to refer to a ‘global reform programme’. 
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revised Income Tax law the following year aimed at reducing and rationalising tax 
exemptions.  
 
However, when the fully drafted law was finally opened to public scrutiny it quickly elicited 
major resistance. The most vocal resistance again came from SMEs and NBR officials, both 
of whom cited capacity constraints and a lack of consultation as their concerns. In practice, 
however, NBR officials were again primarily concerned with defending existing areas of 
discretion and control over hiring, while SMEs were focused on preserving the highly 
advantageous package system for small firms. Resistance from large manufacturing firms 
was publicly more muted, owing both to their reliance on exports and a presumption that the 
impact of formal policy changes would be moderated by continued informality in 
administration. However, large firms began to voice stronger concerns when it became clear 
that the new law might threaten existing exemptions and the scope for collusion with tax 
officials.26  
 
Confronted by this resistance the government quickly withdrew the proposed reform in May 
2011. This decision seemed to be clear evidence of the lack of government commitment to 
reform, as it abandoned far-reaching reform in favour of more modest, and less politically 
contentious, initiatives.27 This followed a common trend in the government’s engagement 
with donors around tax reform, with promises made, but then repeatedly delayed, in an effort 
to maintain access to external funding.28 However, unlike in previous years, the IMF 
responded by redoubling their insistence that a new loan agreement would not be concluded 
without progress on tax reform. Facing a growing liquidity crisis, the government revived 
reform plans following the arrival of an IMF delegation, and again began the process of 
negotiating the formal and informal compromises necessary to satisfy competing interest 
groups. 
 
Over several months prior to March 2012 the revived legislation was revised to include a 
range of concessions to key interest groups. This was not simply about offering formal policy 
concessions, but aimed at preserving key spaces for informality and discretion within the law. 
The government agreed in negotiations with the wholesale and retail sectors (represented by 
the Dokan Malik Samity) not to eliminate existing special regimes, and most notably the 
package system, which offered both low rates and predictability to small firms (The 
Independent 2012). In a similar concession to large firms, the government agreed that firms 
above the threshold for VAT registration would have the option of complying with the 
standard VAT system or of opting for a 5 per cent turnover tax – a seemingly transparent 
handout to a subset of firms with more than adequate capacity for compliance. The 
government likewise agreed to reduce the extent of sanctions for non-compliance 
dramatically, to the point that many viewed the proposed sanctions as clearly inadequate. 
 
                                                        
26 Large firms were particularly concerned by proposed changes to the Income Tax Law, which threatened existing tax 
exemptions. Reform of the income tax legislation largely disappeared from the policy agenda around the same time, 
and speaks to the power wielded by these large firms, as well as prioritisation by the IMF of the VAT reform. 
27  Focusing only on recent years these incremental reforms have been substantial, and are captured in the recent TIB 
(2011: 4) report which notes, ‘introduction of spot assessment and payment of tax through one stop service, two–page 
tax return, appointment of class I and II officials, inclusion of the national identification number in the Taxpayer 
Identification Number (TIN) certificate, arrange tax fair, reward highest taxpayers, distribution of “tax-card”, introduction 
of MIS and tax calculator software in the NBR website, online tax assessment and VAT registration at limited scale, 
make TIN mandatory for specific services like gas and electricity connection, and registration or renewal of fitness 
certificates for vehicles, imposition of penalty in case of using fake TIN, increase of financial punishment, publication of 
books and awareness related leaflets, introduction of electronic cash registers (ECRs), and engage four benches of the 
High Court exclusively to settle tax related cases’.  
28 In the years immediately preceding efforts to reform VAT, multiple donor-funded tax reform projects had reported 
disappointing results, led by the DFID-funded Reforms in Revenue Administration (RIRA) project and the World Bank 
funded Modernization and Automation Project (MAP).  RIRA concluded in 2008 and DFID initially declined a follow-up 
project before initiating a new project in 2011. MAP similarly concluded in 2008, with plans for a follow-up Revenue 
Administration Modernization Project, but the programme was never renewed owing to poor results under MAP.  
 23 
The largest concessions, however, revolved around preserving administrative discretion for 
the NBR, and this appears to have been generally welcomed by larger businesses keen to 
retain scope for the negotiation of tax liabilities. Most notably, the NBR was given power to 
introduce further VAT exemptions ‘in the public interest’ – an amorphous concept open to 
significant collusion between tax officials and large business. In a similar vein, the NBR 
Board was granted significant scope to interpret important policy and administrative aspects 
of the law internally, offering further scope for collusion and greater autonomy for the NBR. 
While the Board was thus given additional discretionary power, a similar provision was put in 
place offering front line tax officials the power to interpret key legal provisions, rather than 
such interpretation being reserved for commissioners. This not only offered additional space 
for collusion with taxpayers, but equally seemed designed to offer younger officers scope to 
develop individual fiefdoms – thus potentially allowing informal networks within NBR to 
circumvent more senior officials. Finally, and in the same vein, the government reintroduced 
rules mandating that firms retain extremely detailed operational information – including 
product-specific input-output tables – which was widely viewed as offering officials 
opportunities to extract informal payments. 
 
By late 2012 the government had thus sought to replicate the strategy employed in 1991, 
preparing a VAT draft to satisfy external demands, while negotiating critical exemptions 
designed to defend key features of the existing system. This initially appeared to have been 
successful, as a US$987 million loan from the IMF was finalised in April 2012, to be 
disbursed in nine tranches (IMF 2012). However, at the final moment the IMF rejected the 
compromises embedded in the new draft of the Act.31 It presented the government with an 
internal memo detailing issues that would need to be addressed if the second tranche of the 
loan agreement was to be disbursed.32 
 
With a continued urgent need for financing, the government quickly acquiesced to essentially 
all of the IMF’s demands (The Daily Star 2013a), while resorting to a strategy of 
incrementalism and informal agreements in an effort to satisfy domestic constituencies. 
Mirroring the 1991 VAT law, the critical element of this compromise was a decision to 
postpone implementation of the new Act until 2015, while postponing changes to the special 
regimes for SMEs an additional three years, until 2018 (The Financial Express 2012). 
Superficially, this simply represented an effort by the government to postpone the pain of 
reform beyond elections scheduled for 2014. However, as with the reform programme in 
1991, the decision to postpone implementation held for businesses and NBR officials an 
implicit suggestion that there would be ample opportunity to chip away gradually at the 
provisions of the Act. Moreover, continued resistance to administrative modernisation, which 
has not been subject to such strict conditionality, appears almost certain to undermine 
implementation of the new Act – a fact not lost on many inside and outside of the NBR. It is 
these implicit promises of continuity, made possible by the informal norms and networks 
governing the tax system, that appear to have played a major role in allowing superficial 
reform to move ahead. The extent to which meaningful reform is actually implemented has 
thus been pushed into an uncertain future.  
4.3 Common strategies and shifting political contexts 
 
Perhaps the most striking feature of these two reform episodes lies in the similarity between 
the compromises underpinning the 1991 and 2012 VAT laws. In both cases the government 
                                                        
31  ‘IMF won’t loosen strings on loans: The lender says it will not release the second installment of $1 billion if conditions 
are not met by Nov’ (The Daily Star 2012b); ‘IMF Asks Government to Alter VAT Bill’ (The Daily Star 2012a). 
32  Of the retention of significant discretion within the NBR, the IMF wrote that, ‘The fundamental features of the VAT 
should be set out in law, not left to the Board (NBR) to prescribe, as this would jeopardise the stability and predictability 
of the tax’. Of proposals to require firms to report input-output coefficients it wrote that, ‘effective tax agencies do not 
require such burdensome calculations to facilitate the auditing of taxpayers’. Of plans to introduce a 5% turnover tax as 
an alternative to the standard VAT, the IMF argued that it ‘undermines the very purpose and key objectives of the new 
VAT by reducing revenue, complicating administration, and severely impeding its operability’.   
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has sought to satisfy external pressure through de jure policy reform, while retaining key 
formal and informal features of the existing system. It has satisfied domestic constituencies 
by seeking to retain key areas of discretion and a reliance on incremental reform, the latter 
relying on an implicit promise that postponing reform will create space for carving out 
additional compromises in the future. These latter compromises have been made possible 
because they build on existing informal rules, norms and networks. It is only the strength of 
these informal practices and relationships that has allowed such a high degree of continuity 
even in the face of seemingly significant policy reform, backed by considerable external 
pressure. 
 
However, the more recent reform has gone somewhat further than the 1991 reform, 
particularly in curbing the legal discretion exercised by NBR officials. In part this is a 
consequence of much greater insistence of the IMF during the more recent reform episode, 
as it has used its considerable leverage to reject major compromises. However, the 
willingness of the government to accept IMF demands also appears to reflect broader 
political changes, which altered the reform context between the initiation of reform in 2009 
and the passage of the VAT Act in 2012.  
 
As noted earlier, the political leadership has long appeared at odds between a desire for 
greater revenue and a reluctance to alter a system that has offered political financing, stable 
growth and an important conduit for delivering patronage to key allies. While the existing 
system has proven extremely stable over time, these conflicts within the political leadership 
also point to the potential for rapid political realignment. With this potential in mind, recent 
developments offer insight into the ways in which seemingly inalterable features of the 
political settlement may become vulnerable to change in response to internal and external 
events. 
 
One element of this shift has been a sudden decline in the power wielded by informal 
networks of patronage and corruption within the NBR. In recent years there has been 
growing pressure for reform in response to external demands from the IMF and the mounting 
fiscal challenges facing the political leadership. These networks nonetheless remained 
stubbornly resistant to reform, as they continued to enjoy critical support from the PMO. 
However, this political balance was disrupted when the strongest NBR ally with the PMO was 
removed from his post in response to allegations of corruption in the procurement of 
infrastructure contracts.  
 
The most immediate consequence of this shift was that the comparatively reformist Minister 
of Finance was able to seize greater control over NBR. On the policy front this led the 
government to refuse NBR demands that they retain the right to approve prices used in 
calculating tax liabilities. This provision had always been opposed by businesses – and 
served only to expose them to petty harassment – and the shift in the political balance made 
it possible to wipe this provision away. Less obviously, the weakening of informal networks 
within NBR opened space for the rationalisation of personnel decisions. New hiring was 
initiated in 2012, while control of the hiring and promotion process by informal networks 
within NBR has been significantly weakened. The latter was reflected in a massive 
reshuffling of staff within the NBR initiated at the end of 2012 in an effort to erode the power 
of those informal networks (The Daily Star 2013b). These moves by the Minister of Finance 
speak to the conflicting incentives facing political elites, and the potential for reform-minded 
leaders to seize the initiative when opportunities arise. 
 
The second element of the shifting political context has been renewed discussion about the 
vulnerability of existing informal practices to politicisation along partisan lines. Bangladesh 
has long been relatively unique in having sustained very high levels of economic growth 
despite aggressive partisan politics and weak formal governance. This apparent paradox has 
been made possible by informal norms of rent sharing among political and economic elites, 
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which have ensured that businesses enjoy low costs, predictability and relative insulation 
from partisan political competition. Informal norms governing taxation have been a critical 
part of this broader bargain, and this has historically motivated powerful resistance to tax 
reform. However, this type of informal settlement is inherently at risk of abuse,36 owing to 
high levels of discretion and the weakness of formal rules (Khan 2008b, 2011). 
 
Despite these inherent risks, the existing political balance has been sustained by strong 
informal norms and networks underpinned by a high degree of trust among political and 
economic elites (Hassan 2012). However, recent developments have highlighted the limits of 
this accommodation, and the potential for the tax system to become a tool of partisan 
political competition. In recent years a subset of the economic elites has sought to challenge 
the existing political elite, and to gain a greater share of political power. The government has 
responded aggressively, with the tax system appearing to be used for partisan purposes in 
punishing those challenging the existing balance of political authority.37 The message has 
appeared clear: the tax system will not be employed for partisan political purposes as long as 
competing elites do not seek to challenge the political status quo. These recent episodes 
have highlighted the inherent potential for the politicisation of highly informal tax practices. 
While this remains acceptable to the majority of the economic elite who remain satisfied with 
the prevailing bargain, it has reinforced for some the value of reform that would reduce some 
of the discretion exercised by tax officials.  
 
The spectre of growing partisan politicisation has not, at least for now, been translated into 
broad demands for fundamental reform. However, it has offered new support for reform at 
the margin, contributing to opening additional space for a series of more modest reforms, the 
passage of the VAT law and aggressive moves by the Minister of Finance to weaken 
informal networks with the NBR. Meanwhile, it highlights the potential fragility of the informal 
bargains that have long characterised the tax system, as they depend critically on continued 
trust in the face of both economic challenges and increasingly acrimonious political 
competition (Khan 2008b, 2011; Hassan 2012).  
5 Conclusions 
 
While focusing on the particular case of Bangladesh, the broader goal of this paper has been 
to link two approaches to understanding the political economy of taxation in developing 
countries. The first part of the analysis highlighted the role of formal and informal institutions 
in shaping persistent features of the tax system. The second part of the analysis focused on 
the micro-level political dynamics governing the negotiation of individual episodes of tax 
reform. By combining these two perspectives it has been possible to explain the persistence 
of many key features of the tax system, but to present this persistence as the outcome of the 
continued negotiation of these rules among competing groups. This has shed light on both 
the strategies adopted by competing groups in negotiating incremental reform, and on the 
potential for external and domestic stresses to produce broader shifts in existing informal 
rules, norms and networks. 
 
                                                        
36  As Khan (2008b: 34) has written of comparatively informal forms of economic governance, ‘we would also expect 
growth to be much more vulnerable to disruption … the nature of the business-government relationships may be 
changing independently in many cases because of ongoing changes in the underlying political forces in society. When 
this happens, the continuation of a particular response to market failure may become untenable even with no further 
changes in market challenges’. 
37 Perhaps the most well-known example is the case of Grameen Bank founder Muhammad Yunus, who came under 
attack by the government when he began to engage more actively in politics. As part of this process senior tax officials 
claim that they were asked to look into bringing a tax case against him. In the same vein, a controversial tax evasion 
case was brought against Moudud Ahmed, a leader within the opposition BNP party, in early 2012 (The Daily Star 
2012c). 
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The persistent weakness of the tax system in Bangladesh is best understood as the product 
of well-established informal rules, norms and networks that have served the broader interests 
of political, economic and bureaucratic elites. This political settlement has ensured 
predictably low rates and the strategic distribution of economic rents, despite the existence of 
widespread corruption, discretion and informality. However, this system has not been static. 
Repeated efforts to reform the VAT system – driven to a significant extent by external 
pressure – have seen the government seek to renegotiate existing rules in ways that satisfy 
both external actors and key domestic constituencies. In doing so it has drawn on existing 
informal norms and networks in order to reconcile external pressure for de jure policy reform 
with a desire to preserve key features of the existing system.  
 
Individual reform episodes thus reveal significant continuity, but also highlight the potential 
for changes in the alignment of power and interests to open new spaces for tax reform. Most 
notably, recent years have seen informal networks within the NBR begin to be sidelined, with 
the Ministry of Finance reasserting control over hiring and promotion. This has potentially 
important implications for the organisation of corruption and patronage within the NBR, and 
threatens one of the key pillars of the existing political bargain around taxation. Meanwhile, 
recent instances in which the tax system has been deployed against political opponents have 
highlighted the risks posed by continued informality, and strengthened support for reform in 
some quarters. While the tax system in Bangladesh thus speaks to the potential stability of 
informal rules of the game linking political, economic and bureaucratic elites, it also highlights 
the ways in which sometimes unpredictable shifts in the political environment can open 
unexpected spaces for reform (Haggard and Webb 1993: 144). 
 
Finally, while this paper has focused on the tax system, it has sought to illustrate the 
potential for debates over taxation to act as a lens through which to understand broader 
political dynamics. Studies of political economy dynamics in Bangladesh have focused on the 
so-called paradox of Bangladesh, and the existence of an informal political settlement that 
has ensured the maintenance of a stable growth environment despite the weakness of formal 
governance. This paper has provided a detailed view of the functioning of precisely this 
dynamic in the governance of taxation, thus providing a new dimension to these broader 
accounts. 
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